



# SR003\_7: Failed Bank Report

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## Mainstreet Bank

1650 South Lake Street  
Forest Lake, MN 55025

(3/15/1903 – 8/28/2009)

# Report Objective

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This report has **two** objectives, using the bank's **data**\*:

1. To examine the bank finances in the quarters prior to its failure.
2. To analyze the bank finances using our Key Performance Indicator (KPI) scoring approach to determine if the bank's failure is something we could have predicted.

\*Data source: FDIC and company filings.

# Bank Background

<b>FDIC Certificate #</b>	<b>1909</b>
<b>Parent Holding Company</b>	BancMidwest Corporation
<b>Bank Charter Class</b>	Commercial Bank
<b>Asset Concentration</b>	Commercial Lending Specialization
<b>Product Specialty</b>	Personal and Business Banking Services
<b>Number of Branches</b>	9 (as of June 30, 2009)
<b>Number of Employees</b>	96 (as of June 30, 2009)

<b>Executives</b>	
<b>President</b>	Larry Albert

# What took place?

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**M**ainstreet Bank, Forest Lake, MN was closed by the Minnesota Department of Commerce, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was named Receiver. The estimated cost to the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund is \$95,000,000. All deposits and most assets acquired by Central Bank in Stillwater, Minn. The FDIC and Central Bank agreed to share future losses on \$268 million of assets.

# Key Performance Indicators

KPI Summary for 2009 Q2	
Normalized Income Rating	Very Poor
Delinquent Asset Rating	Moderate
Asset: Liability Rating	Very Poor
Real Estate Asset Rating*	Moderate
Bankability Composite Score	-25.22** (Very Poor)

Possible ratings: *Excellent, Good, Moderate, Poor, Very Poor.*

\*This rating is relevant to the current “financial crisis” fueled by mortgage security backed loans.

\*\*This is out of 100.

# Bank Financial Snapshot

Financial Data Overlay (thousands)			
	2008 Q2	2009 Q2	Percentage Change
<b>Assets</b>	\$ 435,163	\$ 458,533	↑5.37%
<b>Liabilities</b>	\$ 403,640	\$ 463,610	↑14.86%
<b>Net Income</b>	-\$ 5,610	-\$ 23,930	↓326.56%

- The average net income change for all FDIC banks was -176.66% in the same period.
- The average net income change for all the commercial lending specialization banks was -139.89% in the same period.
- Compared with the whole industry and other commercial lending specialization banks Mainstreet Bank's decline from Net Income is relatively large (-326.56%) during 2009.

# Normalized Income Analysis

	2008Q1	2008Q2	2008Q3	2008Q4	2009Q1	2009Q2 
Normalized Income	-1.26%	-0.04%	-1.21%	-1.49%	-1.30%	-3.78%
SD's from Average*	-2.74	-0.11	-1.39	-1.12	-1.81	-3.74
Ranking	Very Poor	Moderate	Poor	Poor	Poor	Very Poor

- Mainstreet Bank had a normalized income of -3.78% in the second quarter of 2009, the quarter before it failed.
- Banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy (commercial lending specialization) had an average normalized income of -0.17%. The standard deviation of the normalized incomes was 0.96%, which means that Mainstreet Bank was almost 4 SD's below the average.
- Since the first quarter of 2008, Mainstreet Bank's normalized income in relation to banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy has declined.

\*Average of banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy



Indicates sign of bank in financial distress

# Delinquent Asset Analysis

	2008Q1	2008Q2	2008Q3 	2008Q4	2009Q1	2009Q2
Weighted Delinquent Asset	1.17%	2.59%	4.68%	3.37%	2.96%	1.95%
SD's from Average*	-0.19	0.64	1.60	0.77	0.45	0.09
Ranking	Good	Moderate	Poor	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate

- Mainstreet Bank had a weighted delinquent assets out of total assets ratio 1.95% in the second quarter of 2009, the quarter before it failed.
- Banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy (commercial lending specialization) had an average weighted delinquent asset of 1.76%. The standard deviation of the delinquent assets was 2.07%, which means that Mainstreet Bank was about 0.09 SD's above the average.
- Mainstreet Bank's weighted delinquent assets ratio has been relatively moderate in all 6 quarters with exception to 2008 Q3.

\*Average of banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy



Indicates sign of bank in financial distress

# Real Estate Loan Asset Analysis

	2008Q1	2008Q2	2008Q3	2008Q4	2009Q1	2009Q2
Real Estate Loan Asset Ratio	61.15%	59.77%	52.31%	47.02%	43.58%	39.26%
SD from Average*	0.36	0.23	-0.30	-0.66	-0.88	-1.20
Ranking	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Good	Excellent

- Mainstreet Bank had a R/A ratio of 39.26% in 09 Q2, the quarter before it failed.
- In 09 Q2, banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy (commercial lending specialization) had an average R/A ratio of 56.21%. The standard deviation of the R/A ratio was 14.07%, which means that Mainstreet Bank was actually 1.20 SD's below the average, earning the rank of "Excellent."

\* Average of banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy



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# Asset: Liability Analysis

	2008Q1	2008Q2	2008Q3 	2008Q4	2009Q1	2009Q2
Asset: Liability Ratio	107.22%	107.81%	106.06%	104.48%	102.55%	98.90%
Median A/L Ratio*	110.92%	110.69%	110.65%	110.51%	110.53%	110.52%
Ranking	Poor	Poor	Very Poor	Very Poor	Very Poor	Very Poor


- Mainstreet Bank's A/L ratio has been unhealthy in the last 6 quarters and eventually dropping to 98.90% in the last quarter prior to its failure, where its liabilities exceeded its assets.
- The median A/L ratio for all banks in the same asset concentration hierarchy (commercial lending specialization) was 110.52% in the same period, meaning that Mainstreet Bank was more than 11% under the median. The median A/L ratio for all banks in 2009 Q2 was 110.98%.
- Of the 50 banks failed in 2009 Q3, 94% of them had an A/L ratio under 107%.

\* Average of banks of the same asset concentration hierarchy



Indicates sign of bank in financial distress

# Asset & Liability History




- The difference between asset and liability was getting closer in 08 Q3.



Indicates sign of bank in financial distress

# Asset/Liability History




- The A/L ratio begins to decline steadily after 08 Q2.



Indicates sign of bank in financial distress

# Net Income History




- The bank recorded big losses in the last four quarters prior to failure.
- Net income remained negative after 08 Q2.




Indicates sign of bank in financial distress

# Asset Allocation



- The average percentage of Net Loans for banks of the same Asset Concentration Hierarchy in the second quarter of 2009 was 67.77%.
- The average Net Loan percentage of all banks in the second quarter of 2009 was 55.79%.

# Loan Breakdown



- The average percentage of Real Estate Loans for banks of the same Asset Concentration Hierarchy in the second quarter of 2009 was 68.36%.
- The average percentage for all banks in the second quarter of 2009 was 63.40%.

# Events Timeline

- Oct 7, 08** - Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Temporarily Increases Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage from \$100,000 to \$250,000 per Depositor.
- Oct 14, 08** - FDIC creates new program to guarantee bank debts and fully insure non-interest bearing deposit transaction accounts.
- Oct 14, 08** - The Treasury Department will invest up to \$250 billion in the nation's banks via the Capital Purchase Program.
- Nov 20, 08** - FDIC announces the availability of IndyMac Loan Modification Model.
- Nov 25, 08** - Created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to support the issuance of asset-backed securities collateralized by loans.
- Dec 3, 08** - SEC approved measures to strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies.
- Dec 16, 08** - Troubled banks have to provide certain position level and counterparty level data and QFC counterparty and portfolio identifiers to FDIC in a timely manner.
- Dec 23, 08** - Treasury provides TARP funds to focal Banks by purchasing \$2.8 billion investment from 49 banks.
- Dec 30, 08** - The Fed announced that it will purchase mortgage-backed securities.
- Jan 15, 09** - The Senate voted to allow access to the remaining bailout funds of \$350 billion.
- Jan 27, 09** - As part of the Capital Purchase Program, Treasury announced investments of \$386 million in 23 healthy banks.
- Jan 31, 09** - Received a "cease-and-desist" order from FDIC to raise more capital and reduce its concentration of construction and land development loans.

\* All internal news are written in blue color.

# Events Timeline

- Feb 10, 09** - A Capital Assistance Program to help ensure banks hold sufficient capital, produce a more consistent and forward-looking assessment of risks on banks' balance and their potential capital needs.
- Feb 10, 09** - Geithner rolls out the Financial Stability Plan, promises to perform "stress tests" on big banks, and commit \$100 billion to boost the TALF.
- Feb 10, 09** - Treasury and Fed expanded the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending facility up to \$1 trillion.
- Feb 18, 09** - President Obama signs the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which limits bonuses of the highest earning executives.
- Feb 28, 09** - Several banks in Minnesota, including Mainstreet, receive another warning to stop making risky loans.
- Mar 23, 09** - Using TARP capital and capital from private investors, the Public-Private Investment Program will generate \$500 billion in purchasing power to buy legacy assets.
- Apr 27, 09** - Hiring spree because of the changing market. A good portion of the bank's commercial customers are residential real estate-related companies.
- May 1, 09** - The Fed announces that, starting in June, commercial mortgage backed securities and securities backed by insurance premium finance loans will be eligible collateral under the TALF. The Treasury purchases a total of \$45.5 million in preferred stock from 7 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program.

\* All internal news are written in blue color.

# Events Timeline

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- May 8, 09** - The Treasury purchases of total of \$42 million in preferred stock from 7 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program.
- May 13, 09** - The Treasury proposes amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act and securities laws to enhance govt. regulation of over the counter derivatives markets.
- May 14, 09** - SEC proposed rule amendments to strengthen safeguards of investor funds controlled by investment advisers.
- May 29, 09** - FDIC tightens the deposit interest rates paid by banks that are less than well capitalized. Generally, such banks will be permitted to offer to "national rate" plus 75 basis points.
- Jun 9, 09** - 10 Of the largest U.S financial institutions are expected to make CPP repayments to Treasury.
- Jul 2, 09** - FDIC proposed guidelines require private equity firms to hold bank purchases for 3yrs and maintain capital levels.
- Jul 8, 09** - The Legacy Securities program is designed to facilitate price discovery to re-deploy capital and extend new credit to households and businesses. Treasury will invest up to \$30 billion of equity and debt.
- Jul 15, 09** - SEC voted unanimously to propose rule amendments to improve the quality and timeliness of municipal securities disclosure.

# Events Timeline

- Jul 29, 09** - SEC announced several actions that would protect against abusive short sales and make more short sale information available to the public.
- Aug 26, 09** - Banking organizations affected by the new accounting standards generally will be subject to higher minimum regulatory capital requirements. New standards for investors interested in acquiring or investing in the deposit liabilities of failed banks or thrifts.
- Aug 27, 09** - Aggregate net loss of \$3.7 billion in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of \$8.5 billion from the \$4.8 billion in profits the industry reported in the second quarter of 2008.
- Aug 28, 09** - Mainstreet Bank was closed by the Minnesota Department of Commerce. Cental Bank assumed all of the deposits.
- Sep 9, 09** - FDIC Board adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) that reaffirms the expiration of the debt guarantee component of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program.
- Sep 17, 09** - SEC voted unanimously to take several rulemaking actions to bolster oversight of credit ratings agencies by enhancing disclosure and improving the quality of credit ratings
- Sep 24, 09** - Credit quality declined sharply for loan commitments of \$20 million or more held by multiple federally supervised institutions.
- Sep 28, 09** - SEC (Section 31) fee rate applicable to securities transactions on the exchanges and in the over-the-counter markets will be set at \$12.70 per million dollars.
- Sep 29, 09** - Institutions to prepay their estimated quarterly risk-based assessments for the fourth quarter of 2009 and for all of 2010, 2011 and 2012.

\* All internal news are written in [blue color](#).

# Report Summary – *Surprise?*

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Based on the methods with which we analyzed Mainstreet Bank, its failure was ***not a surprise.***

Here are the indications that Mainstreet Bank should fail:

- 1) **Mainstreet Bank's normalized income has been negative for the past six quarters, and experienced a total loss (of its total assets) of almost 8% over the last 4 quarters.**
- 2) **The bank's A/L ratio fell below 107% in the third quarter of 2008, and declined steadily to 98.90% in the last quarter, meaning it could no longer meet its obligations.**
- 3) **Mainstreet Bank had a bankability composite score of -25.22 the quarter before it failed, indicating the bank's very poor overall financial health and likelihood to fail.**

# References

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